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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE 1983·84 TERM 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
The 1983-84 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court ended 
on July 5, 1984. The most significant decisions hand-
ed down by the Court, U.S. v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 
(1984), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S.Ct. 
3424 (1984), recognized a good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule. The last issue of the Reporter dis-
cussed these cases. This article summarizes some 
of the Court's other criminal procedure cases. 
ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Private Searches 
The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreas-
onable searches and seizures applies only to govern-
mental searches; it does not apply to private search-
es. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 456 (1921). Never-
theless, a private search thathas been significantly 
expanded by the police does fall within the purview 
of the Fourth Amendment and thus triggers the war-
rant requirement. Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
In U.S. v. Jacobsen, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984), Federal 
Express employees observed a white powdery sub-
stance while examining a damaged package. They 
notified a DEA agent and apparently repackaged the 
substance. Upon his arrival, the agent removed the 
substance and subjected it to a chemical test which 
revealed the presence of cocaine. The defendant ar-
gued that the search was illegal because the agent 
had failed to obtain a warrant, while the Government 
contended that the field test did not change the pri-
vate character of the search. The Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the defendant. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court's analysis involved three steps. First, the Court 
found that the removal of the powder from the pack-
age did not violate any privacy interest because the 
agent learned nothing more than what the private 
employees had already revealed to him. Second, the 
seizure of the package prior to testing was constitu-
tionally permissible because an examination of the 
package provided probable cause for such a limited 
seizure. Third, field testing did not implicate any 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment: 
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not 
a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise 
any legitimate interest in privacy ... [E]ven if the results 
are negative-merely disciosing that the substance is 
something other than cocaine-such a result reveals 
nothing of special interest. Congress had decided ... to 
treat the interest in "privately" possessing cocaine as 
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal 
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 
"private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest. /d. at 1662. 
Open Fields Doctrine 
The "open fields" doctrine, first announced by the 
Supreme Court in Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57 (1924), 
permits the police to enter and search a field without 
a warrant. The continued validity of this doctrine, 
however, was suspect after the Court decided Katz v. 
U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Court in Katz held that 
the Fourth Amendment applies whenever a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
In Oliver v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984), narcotics 
officers entered the defendant's farm without a war-
rant and discovered marijuana. During their entry, the 
officers walked around a locked gate which was post-
ed with a "no trespassing" sign. In addition; the field 
was secluded-bounded on all sides by woods, 
fences, embankments and not observable from any 
point of public access. The district court, citing Katz, 
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation 
that the fields would remain private, a ruling that trig-
gered the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. It reaf-
firmed the open fields doctrine, finding no conflict 
between that doctrine and the Katz decision: "an in-
dividual may not legitimately demand privacy for ac-
tivities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the 
area immediately surrounding the home." 104 S.Ct at 
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1741. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited 
three factors that are relevant to determining wheth-
er a reasonable expectation of privacy exists: the in-
tention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the 
uses to which a location is put, and the societal un-
derstanding that certain areas deserve protection 
from government invasion. According to the Court, 
none of these factors require Fourth Amendment 
protection for open fields. Unlike a home, an open 
field does not provide a setting for those intimate ac-
tivities that the Framers intended to shelter from gov-
ernmental interference. Moreover, there is no socie-
tal interest in protecting the privacy of those activi-
ties, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in 
open fields. Finally, fences and "no trespassing" 
signs generally do not effectively bar the public from 
viewing open fields. 
Prison Searches 
Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (1984), involved 
the search of a prison cell, which the inmate 
chaHenged on Fourth Amendment grounds. The case 
required the Court to decide whether prisoners have 
justifiable expectations of privacy in their cells. If 
they do, the Fourth Amendment applies, at least in 
some form. The Court, however, refused to recognize 
Fourth Amendment rights in this context: "The 
recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their in-
dividual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the 
concept of incarceration and the needs and objec-
tives of penal institutions." /d. at 3200. The Court's 
holding rested on its view that security and other ob-
jectives could not be attained if the Fourth Amend-
ment applied to prison cells: "Virtually the only place 
inmates can conceal weapons, drugs, and other con-
traband is in their cells. Unfettered access to these 
cells by prison officials, thus, is imperative if drugs 
and contraband are to be ferretted out and sanitary 
surroundings are to be maintained." /d. 
Beepers 
In U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), the Court held 
that the warrantless monitoring of an electronic 
tracking beeper inside a container of chemicals did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment when the informa-
tion revealed could have been obtained by visual 
surveillance. This Term, the Court in U.S. v. Karo, 104 
S.Ct. 3296 (1984), decided several other issues 
relating to beepers. 
A beeper was installed in a can of ether with the 
consent of the owner when DEA agents learned that 
the defendants intended to use the ether to extract 
cocaine from clothing imported into the country. 
After the defendants purchased the cans of ether, in-
cluding the one with the beeper, the agents maintain-
ed surveillance by means of the beeper for several 
months, following the cans when they were moved 
on several occasions. The agents eventually obtain-
ed a warrant and searched a house, discovering the 
cocaine. Defendants moved to suppress the evi-
dence on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
On review, the Supreme Court held that the in-
stallation of the beeper in the can did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the owner consented to 
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the installation. Moreover, the Court held that the 
transfer of the can to the defendants did not violate 
their right of privacy; the transfer "conveyed no infor-
mation that Karo wished to keep private, for it con-
veyed no information at all." /d. at 3302. Consequent-
ly, there was no search. Nor was there a seizure, 
because the defendants' possessory interest in the 
cans were not interfered with in any meaningful way. 
The Court, however, did find that monitoring the 
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to 
visual surveillance, violated the Fourth Amendment. 
The warrantless use of the beeper, according to the 
Court, was the equivalent of a warrantless entry into 
the house. Although it is less intrusive than a full-
scale search, it does reveal a critical fact about the 
premises that the Government could not have other-
wise learned without a warrant. This fact distinguish-
ed Karo from Knotts because in the latter case the 
beeper revealed nothing about the interior of a 
house. Moreover "[r]equiring a warrant will have the 
salutary effect of ensuring that use of beepers is not 
abused, by imposing upon agents the requirement 
that they demonstrate in advance their justification 
for the desired search." /d. at 3305. 
Probable Cause -Informants 
In the 1982-83 Term the Court in Illinois v. Gates, 103 
S.Ct. 2317 (1983), overruled the Aguilar-Spinelli two-
prong test for establishing probable cause. According 
to those cases, information obtained from an inform-
ant could not establish probable cause for a search 
unless the (1) basis of the informant's knowledge and 
(2) reliability of his information were demonstrated. 
Rejecting this two-prong test in Gates, the Court sub-
stituted a "totality of the circumstances" approach. 
The lower courts have split on the meaning of Gates. 
Some have interpreted Gates narrowly; others have in-
terpreted it liberally. In a per curiam decision, Massa-
chusetts v. Upton, 104 S.Ct. 2085 (1984), the Supreme 
Court summarily reversed one of the more stringent 
applications of Gates. The Court wrote: "The Massa-
chusetts court apparently viewed Gates as merely add-
ing a new wrinkle to [the Aguilar-Spinelli] two-pronged 
test: where an informant's veracity and/or basis of 
knowledge are not sufficiently clear, substantial cor-
roboration of the tip may save an otherwise invalid war-
rant." /d. at 2087. The Court went on to comment: "We 
think that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts misunderstood our decision in Gates. We did not 
merely refine or qualify the two-pronged test. Were-
jected it ... " /d. Instead of considering the informant's 
information as a whole, the state court judged only 
"bits and pieces of information in isolation against the 
artificial standards provided by the two-pronged test." 
/d. at 2088. Moreover, the state court failed to defer to 
the trial court's judgment and instead conducted a de 
novo review. According to the Court, "[a] deferential 
standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches conduct 
ed pursuant to a warrant." /d. 
Automobile Exception 
In Chambersv. Maroney,399 U.S.42(1970), the Court 
held that the police could conduct a warrantless 
search of an aut om obi le when it has been stopped on 
the road and there is probable cause to believe 
evidence is in the car. Although this exception to the 
warrant requirement was based on the mobility of the 
car, the Court held that a search of the car at the police 
station after it had been immobilized was also per-
missible. In a per curiam opinion, Florida v. Meyers, 104 
S.Ct. 1852 (1984), the Court reaffirmed Chambers. In 
Meyers the police searched a validly impounded car 
eight hours after the defendant had been arrested and 
his car seized. The Court ruled the search constitu-
tional under Chambers and its progeny. 
Warrantless Arrests in Houses 
In a 1980 case, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 
(1980), the Court had held that in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances, a warrantless arrest in the home 
violated the Fourth Amendment. At that time, how-
ever, the Court declined to consider what circum-
stances would qualify as "exigent." The Court ad-
dressed one aspect of this issue in Welsh v. Wiscon-
sin, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (1984), where the police made a 
warrantless night entry into the defendant's home in 
order to arrest him for a nonjailable traffic offense. 
After driving his car off the road, the defendant left 
the scene and walked a short distance to his home. 
When the police arrived at the scene, they learned of 
the defendant's action from a witness, who opined that 
the defendant was either inebriated or very sick. The 
police obtained the defendant's address from the car's 
registration and proceeded to his home without secur· 
ing a warrant. The defendant's stepdaughter answered 
the door, at which time the police proceeded to an 
upstairs bedroom where they placed the defendant 
under arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxi-
cant. The state supreme court upheld the arrest 
because it found a number of exigent circumstances: 
the need for hot pursuit of a suspect, the need to pre-
vent physical harm to the offender and the public, and 
the need to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. According to 
the Court: 
Before agents of the government may invade the sanc-
tity of the home, the burden is on the government to 
demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the 
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all 
warrantless home entries .... When the government's in-
terest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presump-
tion of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the 
government usually should be allowed to make such ar-
rests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by 
a neutral and detached magistrate. /d. at 2098. 
In sum, the seriousness of the offense for which 
the arrest is made is an important factor in evaluat-
ing the exigency of the situation. The possibility that 
the blood-alcohol content would dissipate if the 
police failed to act quickly was not a compelling 
reason in light of the fact that the State treated first-
offender drunk driving as a noncriminal civil offense. 
Moreover, there was no continuous hot pursuit from 
the scene of the crime and the public safety was not 
at risk because the defendant was already at home 
and the car was abandoned. 
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INTERROGATIONS 
Miranda-Misdemeanor Cases 
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), the 
Court considered the applicability of Miranda to 
misdemeanor traffic offenses. The Court refused to 
recognize a "misdemeanor" exception, holding that 
the Miranda requirements applied "regardless of the 
nature or severity of the offenses of which [the de-
fendant] is suspected or for which he was arrested." 
/d. at 3148. According to the Court, a misdemeanor 
exception would be difficult to apply because the 
police often do not know whether a felony or misde-
meanor has been committed at the time of arrest and 
interrogation. Moreover, investigations which initially 
focus on minor offenses sometimes escalate into in-
vestigations of serious crimes. 
In order to decide the case, however, the Court was 
required to address a second issue-whether the 
roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant 
to a routine traffic stop should be considered "custodi-
al interrogation." The Miranda warnings are required 
only during custodial interrogation. In resolving this 
issue, the Court acknowledged that the stopping of an 
automobile was a "seizure" within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979). Miranda, however, is based on Fifth, not 
Fourth, Amendment concerns-namely, the inherent-
ly coercive atmosphere associated with police inter-
rogations. The Court found that these concerns were 
not significant during the typical traffic stop because 
such stops are of relatively short duration and occur in 
public view, thus reducing the ability of an unscrupu-
lous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-
incriminatory statements. Accordingly, the Court held 
that traffic stops were not "custodial" within the 
meaning of Miranda. 104 S.Ct. at 3151. The Court, 
however, noted that a person subject to a traffic stop 
could be treated in such a way as to render him "in 
custody" for practical purposes, thereby triggering the 
Miranda requirements. In determining when a stop has 
been transformed into the functional equivalent of an 
arrest, the Court used an objective test: "how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have 
understood his situation." /d. at 3152. 
Miranda-The Public Safety Exception 
In New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984), the 
Court recognized a "public safety" exception to Miran-
da. The defendant in Quarles was arrested soon after 
the police were informed by a rape victim that a man fit-
ting his description had attacked her. The complaint 
included the fact that the rapist had a gun. At the time 
of his arrest, the defendant was wearing an empty 
shoulder holster. After handcuffing the defendant, the 
arresting officer asked where the gun was and the de-
fendant responded, "the gun is over there." The trial 
court excluded both the statement and the gun. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed, recognizing 
for the first time a "public safety" exception to Miran-
da: "So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in 
the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts un-
known, it obviously posed more than one danger to the-
public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a 
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customer or employee might later come upon it." /d. at 
2632. The Court went on to hold that in such a situation 
the threat to the public safety outweighed the need for 
Miranda's prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
Amendment. Although the Court labeled the public 
safety exception a "narrow exception," it failed to pro-
vide much guidance on its applicability. 
Probation Officer Interrogations 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S.Ct. 1136 (1984), involved 
the admissibility of statements made by a defendant 
during a meeting with his probation officer. In 1974 
Murphy was questioned by the police concerning a 
rape-murder. No charges were brought at that time. In 
1980 he was convicted of false imprisonment, an of-
fense which arose from an unrelated sex episode. He 
was placed on probation on the condition that he par-
ticipate in a program for sexual offenders. A counselor 
in the program subsequently informed his probation 
officer that he had admitted committing the 1974 rape-
murder. When confronted with this admission, Murphy 
also confessed to the probation officer. He was subse-
quently indicted fort.hat crime and moved to suppress 
his statements on Fifth Amendment grounds. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected Murphy's 
claim. Although he was subject to a number of re-
strictive conditions, he was not under arrest and was 
free to leave arthe end of the meeting. Accordingly, 
he was not in custody and thus had no right to 
Miranda warnings. 
In addition, the Court reiterated its long standing 
position that the Fifth Amendment generally is not 
self-executing; that is, a person subject to compulsion 
must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege. Other-
wise, his statements are considered voluntary. In re-
versing Murphy's conviction, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court had cited a number of factors which it thought 
justified an exception to this rule: (1) the probation of-
ficer could compel the defendant's attendance and 
truthful answers, (2) the officer consciously sought in-
criminating evidence, (3) the defendant did not expect 
to be questioned about the rape murder, and (4) no 
observers were present to protect against abuse and 
trickery. The Court found these factors unpersuasive. 
According to the Court, most of these factors are pres-
ent when a witness testifies before a grand jury and 
Miranda has not been applied in that context. 
Moreover, the meeting with the probation officer did 
not present the same coercive atmosphere that is pres-
ent during police interrogations. 
Finally, the Court declined to find that the state 
had applied an impermissible penalty to the defend-
ant's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right. There 
was no indication that under state law his probation 
would be revoked because he claimed the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE 
The Supreme Court has long held that the exclusion-
ary rule applies not only to primary evidence obtained 
as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure but also 
to evidence later discovered and found to be derivative 
of an illegality or"fruit of the poisonous tree." Nardone 
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v. U.S., 308 U.S. 338,341 (1939). The Court, however, has 
r~cognized several exceptions to the derivative evi-
dence doctrine. For example, the Court has held that if 
knowledge of the "fruits" is gained from an "independ-
ent source" the evidence is admissible. Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. U.S., 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Two of the 
Court's cases this Term involved the derivative evi-
dence doctrine. One case involved the traditional"in-
dependent source" exception; the other recognized a 
new exception-the "inevitable discovery" rule. 
Independent Basis 
In Segura v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 3380 (1984), narcotics 
. agents received information that the defendants 
were trafficking in cocaine from their apartment. 
Eventually, one of the defendants was arrested in the 
lobby of the apartment building and was taken to the 
apartment, at which time the police secured the 
apartment until a search warrant could be obtained. 
The agents conducted a limited security check of the 
apartment and discovered some drug paraphernalia 
in plain view. They then arrested the second defend-
antwho had been in the apartment, discovering addi-
tional evidence during a search incident to arrest. 
The defendants were transported to DEA headquar-
ters, while two agents remained in the apartment 
awaiting the warrant. The warrant, however, was not 
executed until19 hours after the initial entry. The 
search conducted pursuant to the warrant revealed 
drugs, weapons, and drug trafficking records. 
The trial court ruled that the initial entry was illegal 
because there had been no exigent circumstances to 
justify a warrantless entry. Consequently, the evi-
dence discovered during the inital entry and search in-
cident to arrest were illegal"fruits." The court also 
considered the evidence obtained in the search pursu-
ant to the warrant as illegal"fruits" of the initial entry. 
The Supreme Court accepted the lower court's 
finding that the initial entry and search incident to 
arrest were illegal and considered only the admissi-
bility of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. 
The Court held that although the entry into the apart-
ment may have been illegal, the "seizure" of the 
premises (even from within) based on probable cause 
was not: "We hold ... that securing a dwelling, on 
the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence or removal of evidence while a 
search warrant is being sought is not itself an un-
reasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its con-
tents." /d. at 3389. Accordingly, the evidence eventu-
ally seized by warrant was not tainted by the seizure 
of the apartment. Furthermore, this evidence was ob-
tained from a source independent of the illegal initial 
entry. None of the evidence on which the warrant 
was secured derived from this entry; it had been ob-
tained prior to the entry. 
Inevitable Discovery 
In Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984), the Court 
recognized for the first time that evidence unconsti-
tutionally seized may nevertheless be admissible if it 
would have been inevitably discovered by the police. 
Williams was convicted of the murder of a ten-year-
old girl. His first conviction was overturned by the 
Supreme Court in 1977 because he was denied the 
right to counsel at the time he made incriminating 
statements that led to the discovery of the victim's 
body. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Al-
though his inculpatory statements were not offered 
~ in evidence at the retrial, the prosecution did intro-
' duce evidence concerning the location of the vic-
tim's body, its condition, articles and photographs of 
clothing, and the results of postmortem medical and 
chemical tests. Williams claimed that this evidence 
was the "fruit" of his illegally obtained confession. 
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. As in 
other recent cases, the Court began its analysis by 
focusing on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule. According to the Court, this deterrent effect is 
notundercut by the recognition of an inevitable dis-
covery rule: "If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered 
by lawful means ... then the deterrence rationale 
has so little basis that the evidence should be re-
ceived." /d. at 2509. Here, the prosecution argued 
that the victim's body would have been discovered 
by a search party even if Williams had not made his 
incriminatory admissions. Significantly, the Court 
refused to recognize a good faith component to the 
inevitable discovery rule. All that the prosecution is 
required to show is that the evidence probably would 
have been discovered, a finding that the Court said 
was supported by the record in Williams' case. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
~ ln~~:c~~~r~:s:~:~~~portant"right to counsel cases 
involved the appropriate standard for determining 
whether a defendant has been denied the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), the Court defined that 
standard. Although all the federal circuit courts and 
most state courts had adopted the "reasonably ef-
fective assistance" standard in one formulation or 
another, the Supreme Court had not directly consid-
ered the issue until Washington. The Court set forth 
two requirements for an ineffectiveness claim: 
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's per-
formance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defend-
ant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense." /d. at 2064. 
As for the first issue-deficient representation-
the Court adopted the reasonably effective assistance 
standard. The defendant must establish that the repre-
sentation fell below an objective standard of reason-
ableness. According to the Court, no specific guide-
lines can be articulated: "The proper measure of attor-
ney performance remains simply reasonableness un-
der prevailing professional norms." /d. at 2065. The 
~._-· ABA Standards are guides for determining what is rea-
' sonable, but they are only guides. The Sixth Amend-
ment, in the Court's view, is not designed to improve 
the quality of legal representation but rather to ensure 
a fair trial. Moreover, judicial scrutiny of counsel's per-
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formance must be "highly deferential." "It is all too 
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's 
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence .... " 
/d. at 2066. Accordingly, "a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might 
be considered sound trial strategy.' "/d. at 2066-67. 
In considering the second issue, the Court held 
that counsel's performance, even if falling below pre-
vailing norms, must prejudice the defense. The Court 
adopted the following standard for judging prejudice: 
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
/d. at 2068. The Court, however, did recognize some 
situations in which prejudice would be presumed, in-
cluding instances of state interference with 
counsel's role and conflicts of interest. 
In U.S. v. Cronic, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984), the tria-l 
court appointed a young lawyer with a real estate 
practice to represent the accused and allowed him 
only 25 days to prepare for trial on mail fraud 
charges. The court of appeals found that the ac-
cused had been denied effective assistance of 
counsel based on a number of factors: the time af-
forded for preparation, the experience of counsel, the 
gravity of the charge, the complexity of possible 
defenses, and the accessibility of witnesses. 
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not question 
the relevancy of any of these factors. Instead, the 
Court held that the lower court improperly inferred 
incompetency based on these factors. According to 
the Court, a claim of ineffective assistance generally 
can be established "only by pointing to specific er-
rors made by trial counsel." /d. at 2051. Moreover, 
these specific errors must adversely affect the trial: 
"Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the 
reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee is generally not implicated." /d. at 2046. 
The Court remanded the case for such a determination. 
Standby Counsel 
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the 
Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel included the right to conduct 
one's own defense. The Court also held that a trial 
court may appoint "standby counsel" to assist the 
prose defendant in such as case. In McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 104 S.Ct. 944 (1984), the Court was called 
upon to decide the role of standby counsel who is 
appointed over a defendant's objection. 
The Court identified two values underlying the right 
of self-representation. The first is the defendant's 
right to control the case presented to the jury: "The 
prose defendant must be allowed to control the or-
ganization and content of his own defense, to make 
motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir 
dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court 
and the jury at appropriate points in the trial." /d. at 
949. There was no question that Wiggins exercised 
these rights at his trial. His principal argument was 
that the standby counsel impaired his defense_by in-
trusive and unsolicited participation in the trial. 
The second value underlying Faretta, according to 
the Court, concerns the jury's perception of the de-
fendant's control over the case: "[P]articipation by 
standby counsel without the defendant's consent 
should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception 
that the defendant is representing himself." /d. at 951. 
As the Court poi"nted out, however, this value is not 
undercut by counsel's participation in the trial outside 
the presence of the jury. As long as the defendant is 
given an opportunity to express his views to the trial 
judge, this right is protected. The judge is presumed 
capable of differentiating between the defendant's 
and standby counsel's views on legal issues. 
Participation by standby counsel in the presence 
of the jury presents a more difficult question. Never-
theless, the Court refused to adopt a categorical ban 
on counsel's participation before the jury. In evalu-
ating whether counsel's involvement eroded the right 
to self-representation in this context, the Court iden-
tified several factors. First, the defendant's conduct 
in agreeing to counsel's participation is relevant. 
Once the defendant invites participation, subsequent 
appearances by counsel are presumed to be with the 
defendant's acquiescence-at least, until he express-
ly requests counsel's silence. Second, counsel's par-
ticipation in routine procedural and evidentiary is-
sues does not infringe the right of self-representation. 
Initiation of the Right to Counsel 
In U.S. v. Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (1984), defend-
ants who were serving sentences in a federal prison 
were placed in administrative detention following the 
murders of fellow inmates. They remained in deten-
tion for an extended period until they were indicted 
on criminal charges. The court of appeals held that 
the right to counsel attached when the defendants 
were placed in administrative detention, even though 
not yet indicted. The Supreme Court reversed, citing 
prior cases which held that the right to counsel does 
not attach until the commencement of adversary 
judicial proceedings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 
(1972). According to the Court, placement in admin-
istrative detention is not the initiation of judicial 
adversary proceedings and thus the right to counsel 
had not attached. 
DOUBlE JEOPARDY 
The Supreme Court decided a number of double 
jeopardy cases this Term. The Court's prior cases 
have recognized three separate guarantees em-
bodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after conviction, and against multiple 
punishments for the same offense. Illinois v. Vitale, 
447 U.S. 410 (1980). 
Civil Suits Following Acquittal 
In U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 
S.Ct. 1099 (1984), a gun owner argued that his prior 
acquittal on criminal charges involving firearms 
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precluded a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding 
against those firearms. The Supreme Court rejected 
his argument, adhering to the traditional view that 
the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits only a second 
criminal trial. According to the Court, "neither col· 
lateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, 
remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an 
acquittal on related criminal charges." /d. at 1104. 
Death Penalty Acquittal 
In Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S.Ct. 2305 (1984), the 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and 
armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to life 
imprisonment because it found the aggravating cir-
cumstances specified in the state death penalty 
statute inapplicable. The defendant appealed on an 
unrelated issue and the state filed a cross-appeal 
on the death penalty issue. The state supreme court 
agreed with the prosecution's view of the death 
penalty statute and remanded for resentencing, at 
which time the death penalty was imposed. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
issue was controlled by Bullington v. Missouri, 451 
U.S. 430 (1981), in which it had held that the ordeal 
and anxiety suffered at a capital sentencing pro-
ceeding was equivalent to that suffered in a trial on 
the merits. Accordingly, the Court held that the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause prohibited the resentencing of a 
defendant to death after the sentencer has in effect 
acquitted the defendant of that penalty, even if the 
acquittal was based on legal error. 
Guilty Pleas 
In Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2536 (1984), the de-
fendant was indicted for murder, involuntary man-
slaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft. All 
offenses arose from the killing of Thomas Hill and 
the theft of property from his apartment. At arraign-
ment, the defendant offered to plead guilty to the 
manslaughter and theft counts. Over the prosecu-
tion's objection, the trial court accepted the pleas 
and dismissed the remaining counts on Double 
Jeopardy grounds, finding that manslaughter and 
theft were lesser included offenses of murder and 
robbery. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's decision. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. According to the 
Court, although the Double Jeopardy Clause protects 
a defendant against cumulatfve punishments for 
convictions for ttie same offense, it does not prohibit 
prosecution for such multiple offenses in a single 
trial. Thus, for example, while the defendant may not 
be punished separately for manslaughter and mur-
der, he could be tried for both at the same time. The 
Court also held that the multiple prosecution aspect 
of the Double Jeopardy Clause would not be violat-
ed. The defendant had never been exposed to con-
viction on the more serious charges; the prosecution 
was not seeking a second chance at conviction; and 
the plea of guilty could not be considered an implied 
acquittal of the more serious charges. 
Mistrials-Hung Jury 
The jury trying the defendant in Richardson v. U.S., 
104 S.Ct. 3081 (1984), acquitted him of one count but 
could not agree on other counts. The trial court 
therefore declared a mistrial and the defendant 
claimed that a second trial would violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because the evidence on there-
;;: maining counts was insufficient for conviction. The 
• defendant relied on Burks v. U.S., 437 U.S. 1 (1978), in 
which the Supreme Court had held that if a defend-
ant obtained an unreversed appellate ruling that the 
evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to con-
vict, a second .trial was precluded by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. In short, a finding of insufficient 
evidence is equivalent to an acquittal. The Supreme 
Court, however, refused to extend Burks to the de-
fendant's case. Instead, the Court adhered to its long 
established rule that a retrial following a hung jury 
does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See 
Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263, 297-98 (1892). 
Sentencing After Retrial 
In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the 
Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy nor 
Equal Protection Clauses precluded an increased 
sentence on retrial following a successful appeal. 
The Court, however, did hold that due process pro-
hibited an increased sentence on retrial where the 
enhanced sentence resulted from vindictive retalia-
tion by the trial judge. According to the Court, such 
vindictiveness might chill a defendant's right to ap-
peal. Thus, an increased sentence on retrial is pre-
sumptively vindictive but this presumption can be 
rebutted by reasons set forth in the record. 
The defendant in Wasman v. U.S., 104 S.Ct. 3217 
-~ (1984), was convicted of making a false statement in 
a passport application and sentenced to a 2-year par-
tially suspended sentence with probation. After his 
conviction was overturned, he was retried and con-
victed. This time he was sentenced to two years im-
prisonment, none of which was suspended. The in-
creased punishment resulted from a conviction for a 
different crime, which was adjudged after the first 
trial. In Wasman the Court found the presumption of 
vindictiveness applicable. It also found, however, 
that the record contained reasons which rebutted the 
presumption-namely, the intervening conviction. 
OPEN TRIALS 
First Amendment Right of Access 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials: "We 
hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit 
in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without 
the freedom to attend such trials ... important as-
pects of freedom of speech and of the press could be 
eviscerated." /d. at 580. In a subsequent case, the 
Court held that the mandatory closure of a trial dur-
in'g the testimony of a sex offense victim was uncon-
stitutional. Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 
457 U.S. 596 (1982). The Court returned to the open 
trial issue last Term. 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.Ct. 
819 (1984), involved a rape-murder trial in which the 
defendant was sentenced to death. Prior to the voir 
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dire examination of propsective jurors, the petitioner, 
Press-Enterprise, moved that the voir dire be open to 
the public. The prosecutor opposed the motion on 
the grounds that the presence of the press would af-
fect the candor of the prospective jurors' responses. 
The trial court ruled to open only the general voir dire 
to the public and press and to close the individual 
voir dire. After the jury was empaneled, Press-
Enterprise moved for the release of the transcript of 
the voir dire proceedings. The court denied this mo-
tion on the grounds it would impinge on the jurors' 
right to privacy. Press-Enterprise sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel the release of the transcript 
and to vacate the closure order. The state courts 
declined to grant relief. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. According 
to the Court, a presumption of openness attends 
criminal trials. This presumption can only be over-
come "by an overriding interest based on findings 
that closure is essential to preserve higher values 
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." /d. at 
824. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court 
found that the record did not support the trial court's 
findings that the defendant's right to a fair trial and 
the jurors' right to privacy were jeopardized by an 
open voir dire. Furthermore, the trial court had failed 
to consider alternative ways to protect these in-
terests. As an example, the Court pointed out that 
the jurors could have been provided with an in 
camera hearing to consider embarrassing questions. 
In addition, sensitive material could have been 
deleted from the transcript. 
Sixth Amendment Right to Public Trial 
In addition to the First Amendment right of access, 
the closing of a criminal trial implicates an accused's 
right to a public trial. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 
443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Supreme Court commented: 
"The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of 
the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt 
with and not unjustly condemned, and that the pres-
ence of interested spectators may keep his triers 
keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to 
the importance of their functions .... " /d. at 380. 
In Wallerv. Georgia, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (1984), the 
Court held that the right to a public trial extends to 
suppression hearings. The hearing could be closed 
over a defendant's objection only if the standards of 
Press-Enterprise have been satisfied: "[T]he party 
seeking to close the hearing must advance an over-
riding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the 
closure must be no broader than necessary to pro-
tect the interest, the trial court must consider 
reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, 
and it must make findings adequate to support the 
closure." /d. at 2216. 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
In Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984), the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of preventive detention 
for accused juvenile delinquents. The question left 
unanswered is whether preventive detention for 
adults is also constitutional. Much of the rationale 
underlying Martin centers on juvenile court proceed-
ings. Although the Court recognized the applicability 
of the Due Process Clause to juvenile proceedings, it 
also recognized the State's parens patriae interest in 
protecting the welfare of children. At one point the 
Court distinguished between juveniles and adults by 
stating that the child's liberty interest "must be qual-
ified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, 
are always in some form of custody." /d. at 2410. 
Other parts of the opinion, however, could be cited 
to support preventive detention for adults. The Court 
held that preventive detention served a legitimate 
state objective-the "legitimate and compelling state 
interest in protecting the community from crime." In 
addition, the Court rejected the view that it is virtually 
impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any 
degree of accuracy: "[F]rom a legal point of view there 
is nothing inherently unattainable abqut a prediction 
of future criminal conduct." /d. at 2417. 
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS 
The defendant in Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S.Ct. 
2916 (1984), was involved in a car accident in which a 
oassenger died. As a result, he was convicted offour 
misdemeanors in a Justice of the Peace Court and 
appealed. Under state law, he was entitled to a trial 
de novo in the Circuit Court. While the appeal was 
pending, a grand jury indicted him for manslaughter 
based on the same incident and he was subsequent-
ly convicted. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the case 
was governed by Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 
(1974). In Perry the Court found a due process viola-
tion where the prosecution obtained an indictment 
after a defendant exercised his right to appeal and 
obtain a trial de novo. According to the Court, a de-
fendant's right to appeal would be chilled if the pro-
secution could obtain an indictment in retaliation for 
the exercise of the right to appeal. In order to 
preclude this resul.t, the Court established a rebut-
table presumption of unconstitutional vindictiveness 
in these circumstances. Since the record in Roberts 
failed to contain evidence rebutting this presump-
tion, the Court reversed. 
PLEA BARGAINS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
In Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S.Ct. 2543 (1984), the 
Court considered whether a defendant's acceptance 
of a prosecutor's proposed plea bargain creates a 
constitutional right to specific performance of that 
bargain. The bargain was withdrawn by the prosecu-
tor after it was accepted by the defendant, but before 
the defendant pled guilty. The defendant later pled 
guilty to a different bargain. According to the Court, 
a "plea bargain standing alone is without constitu-
tional significance; in itself it is a mere executory 
agreement which, until embodied in a judgment of a 
court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any 
other constitutionally protected interest. It is the en-
suing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution." ld 
at 2546. Since the defendant's subsequent plea was 
voluntary, there was no constitutional violation. 
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The Court was careful to distinguish Johnson frorr 
its earlier decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S 
257 (1971). The defendant in that case entered the pie< 
which was accepted by the trial court before the prose 
cutor attempted to renege on the agreement. "It 
follows that when the prosecution breaches its prom 
ise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the 
defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hencE 
his conviction cannot stand ... " 104 S.Ct. at 2547. 
RIGHT OF PRESERVATION 
California v. Trombetta, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984), con-
cerned a defendant's right to have breath samples 
preserved after he had been given an intoxilyzer test 
to determine his blood-alcohol content. The defend-
ant argued that such a right was derived from the 
Due Process Clause. In prior cases, the Court had 
held that due process requires the State to disclose 
to criminal defendants favorable evidence that is 
material either to guilt or to punishment. U.S. v. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963). 
The Court began its analysis by stating that it had 
"never squarely addressed the Government's duty to 
take affirmative steps to preserve evidence on behal1 
of criminal defendants." 104 S.Ct. at 2533. The Court 
refused to recognize such a right, at least in this con· 
text. There was no evidence that the police de-
stroyed evidence for the purpose of avoiding the 
Brady disclosure requirements. Moreover, "[w]hat-
ever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to 
preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evi-
dence that might be expected to play a significant 
role in the suspect's defense." /d. at 2534. In order to 
meet this requirement, the "evidence must possess 
an exculpatory value that was apparent before the 
evidence was destroyed, and also be of a nature that 
the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable 
evidence by other reasonably available means." /d. 
Neither condition is satisfied with breath samples. 
Given the accuracy of the intoxilyzer the breath sam-
ples ar13 rnQre likely to be inculpatory than exculpa-
tory. Moreover, the defendant has other means of 
challenging the evidence. Under state law, he had 
the right to inspect both the machine and the weekly 
calibration results. Other sources of error, such as 
radio waves and the presenc.e of chemicals in the 
blood of people dieting, can be challenged by the 
introduction of evidence at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decisions this Term continue to evi-
dence the conservative trend of recent years. Many 
of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court era 
have been eroded. The good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and the public safety exception to 
Miranda are prime examples. In addition, the present 
majority appears to seek out and reverse those lower 
court decisions that extend constitutional protec-
tions to criminal defendants. There seems little 
reason to believe that this trend will not continue. 
